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1. Introduetion
It does not often happen in academia that one is explicitly encouraged to (als0)
present a nonnative view on a particwar matter. I am grateful therefore to the editor
of this volume for the opportunity to do so in relation to the European Constitu-
tion project. In this chapter, I will explore what a Christian vision of Europe might
look like and assess the extent to which the draft European Constitution meets these
demands. Given the fate of the draft European Constitution hitherto, the question
will also be raised as to the implication of the results of this analysis for any future
phases of the project.
Why would it be worthwhile to do this? First of all, because by mid-2006
Europe (including Russia)1 was the home of around 530 million Christians, still the
highest number of all continents. According to statisticians of religion, the number
of Christians living in Europe will gradually decrease to 514 million in the year
2025. By that time, more Christians will live on other continents, notably Latin
America, where the number is expected to rise frorn 517 to 623 million, and Africa,
where it will grow from 398 to 596 million. In addition, the number of Christians
in Asia will increase from 351 to 498 million and in North America there will be an
increase from 222 to 250 million. Globally speaking, the number of Christians will
grow from 2.2 billion to 2.6 billion, which means from 33 to 33.5% of the world
population. Within that same period, the percentage of for example, Muslims will
grow from 21 to 24, whereas the percentage of the non-religious and atheists will
drop from 14.1 to 12.3.2 Jointly, these figures prove how right the 'recovering secu-
larist', David Brooks, was, when he observed: 'Secularism is not the future; it is
yesterday's incorrect vision of the future' .3 Secondly, almost from the beginning, but
certainly since Saint Augustine started work on The city of God in 413, there has
been a reflection on 'earthly kingdoms' within Christianity.4 It would somehow
seem unwise, and even need explanation, to ignore the fruits of reileetion by such
an historically powerful cultural force.
The topic poses a preliminary problem, however: a Christian vision of Europe
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different denominations, of which, numerically, the Roman Catholic, Protestant
and Eastern Orthodox are the major ones. In this chapter, I will limir myself to the
pluralist approach," which was developed in full during the 20th century by the
Calvinist legal philosopher, Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977). It builds on earlier
Christian writings by such authors as John Calvin (1509-1564), Johannes Althusius
(1557-1638), Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) and Abraham Kuyper
(1837-1920).6 It also shares strong similarities, however, with Roman-Catholic
social teaching. The reason for focusing on the pluralist approach is not just my
more intimate familiariry with it, but also its potential relevanee in the context of
present-day Europe, as characterized by cultural and religious diversity. Further-
more, once stripped of its theological roots, the approach might also prove to be
acceptable to the non-religieus and adherents of other faiths. Finally, whereas in the
N etherlands interest in pluralist thinking is waning, this approach is very much alive
in N orth America.Ï This is all the more interesting, since one of the purposes of the
present volume is to compare the European Union with the United States of
America.
As to the contents of this chapter, in section 2 I will first discuss what the plural-
ist approach is roughly about. In Section 3 I will subsequently focus on the first
central element of this approach, i.e. domestic justice. In Section 4 I will focus on
the second central element of this perspective, i.e. international justice. Lastly, I will
present a conclusion in which the European Constitution project and the pluralist
perspective will be critically assessed in conjunction.
2. The Pluralist Approach to Constitutional Dernocracy"
A major premise of the pluralist perspective is that, no matter how sovereign nation
states and other political entities regard themselves to be, ultimate sovereignty be-
longs to God alone. This view dates back to the early church confession that '[esus
is Lord' (1 Corinthians 12: 3). From this it follows that neither national states nor
supranational institutions, such as the European Union, should be absolutized as the
ideal political organization in this world. The criterion for the legitimacy ofboth the
national state and the European Union is how weIl they are doing in establishing
justice, either nationally or internationally. Since justice in the political sphere will
not readily amount to the ideal of biblical justice, it is referred to as 'public justice'
instead.
5 This approach is sometimes referred to as Christian-pluralist to distinguish it from other pluralist move-
ments, such as American behavioralism, which is actually closer to the individualist tradition. See
'Introduction: the question of pluralism', in: Janles W. Skillen and Rockne McCarthy (eds.), Political
order and the plural struaute ifsociety, Atlanta, Georgia 1991, pp. 1-27.
6 James William Skillen, The Development ifCalvinistic Polideal 7heory in the Netherlands, with special reference
to the thought ifHennan Dooyeweerd, Ph.D. Duke University 1974.
7 See, for example, Luis E. Lugo (ed.), Religion, pluralism, andpubliclife. Abraham Kuyper's legacy Jor the
twenty:first century, Grand Rapids, Michigan 2000; Markets and Morality 5: 2000, nr. 1, Special issue on
'A century ofChristian social teaching: the legacy ofLeo XIII and Abraham Kuyper'.
8 For the purposes of this section, I have in particular drawn on: James W. Skillen, 'What distinguishes
the Center for Public Justice?', PublicJustice Report 21: 1998, nr. 1, pp. 3-6, and nr. 2, pp. 6-7.
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With respect to puhlic justice, it must first of all he noted, generally speaking,
that the 'three great revolutions' that took place in the Netherlands (16th century),
England (17th century) and North America (18th century) respectively, have their
roots, at least in part, in a Calvinist distrust ofpower.9 This fear ofwhat men might
do with power, which has given rise to such doctrines as the ruie oflaw, separation
ofpowers, checks and halances and democraticaccountability, can be traeed back to
the doctrine of the fallenness ofman. I will not elaborate on these and other classical
doctrines of constitutional theory, however, since that is done elsewhere in this
volume.
More specifica1ly, as far as domestic justice is concerned, two kinds of pluralism
are of relevance. The first type is commonly ca1led 'structural pluralism', but could
also be labeled 'horizontal subsidiarity' .10 It starts from the idea that God has created
society with the potential to unfold into a number of different spheres, such as the
family, education, business, the arts and government. Since government constitutes
only one of these spheres, it is under an obligation to recognize and uphold the
autonomy and freedom ofcivil society which has responsibilities ofits own.
The second type is ca1led 'confessional pluralism' . This principle implies that re-
ligion, rather than constituting a separate sphere, has a bearing on all aspects of Iife."
Moreover, since Jesus and Jesus alone is Lord, society should neither be governed
by a particular church (Christian imperialism) nor - as is more applicable to the
United States - by a Christian majority (Christian nationalism). Instead, govern-
ments should uphold the right of all persons who live within their territory to be
free to practice their diverse religious or non-religious faiths in both private and
public life. A society that meets this demand, as the Netherlands has done since
1917, may be called a pluriform democracy, that is 'a demoeratic system with rules
and structures which incorporate the array of subcultura1ly rooted fundamental
perspectives and preferences even into the very services norma1ly considered to
belong to the state exclusiveIy'.12
According to the pluralist approach, the state also has a calling where interna-
tional justice is concerned. This can hardly come as a surprise, inasmuch as ever
since Jesus sent the apostles out 'to the ends of the earth' (Acts 1:8) Christianity has
9 Abraham Kuyper, Leaures on Calvinism, Grand Rapids, Michigan 1994 (1931), p. 86. See also: Marci
A. Harnilton, 'The Calvinist paradox of distrust and hope at the Constitutional Convention" in: Mi-
chael W. McConnell, Robert F. Cochran, Jr. and Angela C. Cannella (eds.), Christian perspeaives on
Legal Thought, New Haven and London 2001, pp. 293-306; John W. Sap, Paving the Wayfor Reuolu-
tion. Calvinism andthe strngglefora democratie constitutional state, Amsterdam 2001.
10 Contrary to vertical subsidiarity, which in Artiele 1-11, par. 3, of the Constitution is referred to as the
principle that 'in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if
and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member
States, either at centrallevel or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or ef-
fects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level'.
11 Note that religion is not synonymous with the church as institution, which is confined to its own
sphere.
12 Stanley Warren Carlson-Thies, Demoaacy in the Netherlands: amsodational or plurifomI?, Ph.D. University
ofToronto 1993, p. 32. See also, by the same author, 'The meaning ofDutch segmentation for mod-
ern America', in: George Harinck and Hans Krabbendam (eds.), Slzaring the Rifonned Tradition: the
Duuh-Notth Amencan exchange, 1846-1996, Amsterdan11996, pp. 159-175.
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been an international movement with global aspirations.':' What this means for gov-
ernments is that they are not only limited with respect to civil society (structural
pluralism), but also that they ultimately reside under Christ's authority. They can-
not, therefore, confine themselves to merely serving their own interests, as the 'real-
ist' approach to international relations expects them to, but should also be con-
cerned with promoting international justice. Their calling is made considerably
more difficult by the present state system, which emphasizes state sovereignty and
does not necessarily recognize an obligation relating to international responsibility. It
is still difficult, on the other hand, to imagine a legitimate form of world govern-
ment that would do away with national states altogether. The ideal is therefore to
persuade these 'sovereign' states and supranational institutions, including the United
States and the European Union respectively, to promote a just international order
with the help ofsuch international organizations as the United Nations.
In sum, the pluralist perspective provides a limited number of distinctive criteria
for constitutional theory, in addition to its significant contribution to the various
classical doctrines. They somehow centre on the concept ofjustice, which is applied
to both domestic and international politics.Domestic justice is defined as compris-
ing structural and confessional pluralism. In spite of certain similarities, these criteria
also set the (Christian-)pluralist approach to constitutional democracy apart from the
school of 'liberal nationalist', or 'ethno-cultural pluralist' thinkers, that emerged in
the course of the last two decades and challenges traditional liberalism. This school
emphasizes normative principles to enhance constitutional accommodation of sub-
state national societies, such as the principle of self-determination, the principle of
representation, the principle of recognition and the principle of reciprocity."
3. Domestic Justice
In attempting to assess how well the draft European Constitution meets the criteria
in the field of domestic justice, as defined by pluralist thought, the first thing to
notice must be that the prolonged debate on whether a reference to the Judeo-
Christian heritage should be included in the Preamble, did not really represent the
heart of the matter. It is understandable, to a certain extent, why the Vatican, the
Conference of European Churches and the European People's Party (Christian
Democrats), for example, have come out in favor of such a reference," especially
since the first draft of the Preamble expressly referred to humanism and respect for
reason. This obvious double standard can only be appreciated against the backdrop
of the negative experiences suffered by certain countries in the past with religious
strife in general and the role of Roman-Catholicism in particular. Yet, from a plu-
ralist perspective, such a reference is not essentia1 and the present fonnula which
contains a general reference to 'the cultura1, religious and humanist inheritance of
Europe' is acceptabIe. Mter all, the Preamble of the American Constitution does
13 See Bob Goudzwaard, Glohalization and the Kingdom of God, Grand Rapids, Michigan 2001,
pp.19-22.
14 See Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Laui and National Pluralism, Oxford 2004.
15 See the contribution by Paul Cliteur to this volume.
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not contain any reference to religion, but starts instead with 'WE THE PEOPLE'.
Moreover, had a specific reference to the judeo-Christian heritage been opted for, it
would have been appropriate to also refer to, in particular, the role of Islam.
Secondly, the considerable attention paid in the draft Constitution to the classical
doctrines of constitutional theory, beginning with the Preamble which refers to 'the
universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, free-
dom, democracy, equality and the rule oflaw', must be noted. Artiele 1-2 proceeds
by listing as values on which the Union is founded 'respect for human dignity, free-
dom, democracy, equality, the rule oflaw and respect for human rights'. In view of
such wording, it is possible to be moderately optimistic about the further develop-
ment of the European Union into a community of values, in particular the values
that underlie the demoeratic constitutional state, as championed by pluralist
thought."
It may be observed, especially in relation to structural pluralism, that in the latter
artiele pluralism, among other things, is said to 'prevail' in the societies of the Mem-
ber States. This, however, implies diversity rather than structural pluralism. Atten-
tion is paid to what could be called 'vertical subsidiarity' (Article 1-11, paragraph 3),
which also has its roots, of course, in Christian - notably Roman-Catholic - social
thought, but not expressly to the concept of horizontal subsidiarity. Admittedly,
there are articles in which the importance of civil society is stressed. An example is
Artiele 1-47, paragraph 2, which calls upon the Union Institutions to enter into 'an
open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations and civil
society'. Artiele 1-48 offers another example, stating that the European Union not
only 'recognizes and promotes the role of the social partners at its level', but must
also 'facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy'.
Finally, according to Artiele 52, paragraph 3, the Union recognizes the identity and
specific contributions of both churches and non-confessional organizations and
promises to 'maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue' with them as weIl.
Yet, it could be argued that this reveals more about the intention to involve civil
society in the policy-making process than that it actually limits the role of govem-
ment in European society. This impression is reinforeed by the fact that in Part II of
the Constitution, which contains the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union,
hardly any reference is made to civil society in the articles on social rights, such as
social security and social assistance, health care and environmental protection. It
must be again stated that neither the American Constitution contains the principle
of structural pluralism. As Alexis de Tocqueville already observed, this has not pre-
vented the United States from developing a flourishing civil society. However,
inasmuch as structural pluralism is a means of achieving limited government and
represents a form of separation of powers in society, there would have been no
objection, from a constitutional theoretical point ofview, to including an artiele on
it in the Constitution. This would have given horizontal subsidiarity the same status
as vertical subsidiarity. As experience with the principle ofsubsidiarity in the past has
shown, such a provision will not guarantee that it is, in effect, respected. It could be
16 'Further' deve1opment, because most of these values have already been included in previous treaties.
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argued, however, that this would be even less guaranteed where there is no refer-
ence in the Constitution. In theory, a similar procedure could have been imagined
with respect to structural pluralism to what is currently set out in the Protocol on
the application of the principles ofsubsidiarity and proportionality.
There is a similar situation in relation to the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights. According to the drafi: Constitution, the European Union will seek
accession to the European Convention for the Proteetion of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Article 1-9, paragraph 2). As a result of this, the case law of
this Court will become more directly relevant to the Union. In its ruling in the case
of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and others versus Turkey, for example, the Court
elaborated considerably on the principle of pluralism. It considered in paragraph 89
'that there can be no democracy without pluralism' .17 Yet, also here, the horizontal
dimension ofsubsidiarity, as emphasized in the pluralist perspective, is lacking.
With respect to confessional pluralism, Artiele 1-52 of the Constitution provides
that the European Union 'respects and does not prejudice the status under national
law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States'
(paragraph 1) and 'equally respects the status under nationallaw ofphilosophical and
non-confessional organizations' (paragraph 2).18 In a similar vein, paragraph 3 of
Article 11-74 guarantees '(t)he freedom to found educational establishments with
due respect for democratie principles and the right of parents to ensure the educa-
tion and teaching of their children in confonnity with their religious, philosophical
and pedagogical convictions (...) in accordance with the national laws governing
the exercise of such freedom and right'. In view of the principle of subsidiarity, this
restraint is understandable, perhaps. More plausible, however, is that the topic of
church-state relations has proven to be too sensitive to be regulated at this stage,
given the problematic nature of the debate on the possible inclusion in the Pream-
bIe of an express reference to the Judeo-Christian heritage. As a result, we will have
to wait and see whether either the French tradition of laïcisme (secularism) or the
Roman-Catholic and Eastem-Orthodox inclination towards Christian nationalism
will prevail. The pluralist approach would offer a third way, acknowledging, con-
trary to laicism, that religion has a public role to play as weIl, while at the same time,
in contradistinction to Christian nationalism, guaranteeing equal treatment of all
religious and non-religieus worldviews. It is to be regretted that this choice could
not be made at this stage; the case of the N etherlands shows that ultimately only a
pluriform public order can meet the needs of minorities with different fundamental
perspectives and preferences." For the sake of the stability of the emerging Euro-
pean political and legal order, therefore, it can only be hoped that paragraph 1 of
Artiele 11-70 on freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which provides that
'(tlhis right includes freedom (...), either alone or in community with others and in
public or in private, to manifest religion or belief: in worship, teaching, practice and
17 Judgment of 13 February 2003. See also the Court's judgment in the case ofLeyla Sahin v. Turkey,
29 June 2004, parr. 15 and 102.
18 These provisions are simi1ar to the ones in the previous treaty as well.
19 See Carlson-Thies, Democracy in the Netheilands.
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observance', will be interpreted broadly." From the American experience it can be
leamed that the u.s. Supreme Court's interpretation of the corresponding First
Amendment has varied considerably in the course of time.21
Thus far, the European Court of Human Rights has, in its own words, 'fre-
quently emphasized the State's role as the neutral and impartial organizer of the
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive
to public order, religious harmony in a demoeratic society' .22 This is neutrality,
however, rather than the pluralist concept of positive neutrality or equal treatment,
which implies that government neutrality is not violated, 'even ifgovernment grants
aid, recognition, or support to religion or religious groups, as long as government
gives equal aid, recognition, or support to all religions and parallel or similar secu-
larly based systems of belief and their organized groups'." Moreover, the Court
tends to afford the states that are party to the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms a considerable margin of appre-
ciation in this area."
4. Inte~ationalJustice
In the Spring 2003 issue of Foreign Affairs, there appeared an artiele by President
Leslie Gelb of the American Council on Foreign Relations, in which he signaled a
'rise of ethics in foreign policy'.25 He pointed, among other things, at the surpris-
ingly strong moral conviction behind Anierica's intervention in Iraq. To what ex-
tent is Europc's anticipated common foreign and security policy also characterized
by ethical and moral concerns? Does it live up to the ideal of international justice, as
advocated in pluralist thought?
The European Union's objectives with regard to the outside world are formu-
lated in Artiele 1-3 of the drafi Constitution. According to its paragraph 4, the Un-
ion shall
'contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity
and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication ofpoverty and
the proteetion of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as weil as to
the strict observance and the development of intemationallaw, including respect
for the principles of the United Nations Charter.'
20 Of re1evance in this context is also Artide 11-82: 'The Union shall respect cultural, religious and lin-
guistic diversity.'
21 See John Witte Jr., Religion and the Amencon Constitutional Experiment. Essential rights and liberties, Boul-
der, Colorado 2000.
22 Case cfRçfäh Partisi (I71e Welfare Party) andothers versus Turkey, 13 February 2003, par. 91.
23 Stephen V. Monsma and ChristopherJ. Soper, 'Equal treatment and societal pluralism', in: Stephen V.
Monsma and J. Christopher Soper (eds.), Equal Treatment cfReligion in a Piuraustic Society, Grand Rap-
ids, Michigan 1998, pp. 1-8, at p. 1. See also, by the same authors, The Challenge cfPlurolism. Churd:
and state injive demoaades, Lanham, Maryland 1997.
24 See, for example, its judgment in Leyla Sohin v. Turkey, 29 June 2004, regarding a ban on wearing the
Islamic headscarf in higher-education institutions.




As was the case in the area of domestic justice, it can be concluded that once the
Constitution is ratified, Europe will more resembie a connnunity of values. There
are at least two differences with the approach adopted by the U.S. Administration
under President George W. Bush. First, whereas in the two editions of The National
Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica (2002, 2006) document an international
order is advocated that, because of its emphasis on political and economie freedom,
resembles the 'caretaker state' as found in traditional Dutch conservatism." Europe
envisions a world order that is rather characterized by the principles of the welfare
state. Second, whereas the United States prefers a unilateral approach, Europe opts
for a multilateral approach within international organizations and structures, gov-
erned by rules of international law. Admittedly, in either case the difference is rela-
tive rather than absolute. The European position nevertheless corresponds clearly
more to the pluralist perspective, than do the U.S. policies pursued by the born-
again Christian George W. Bush.27
At this point, the question could well be raised as to how realistic Europe's strat-
egy is, compared to that of the U nited States. In order to answer this question, it is
useful to reeall the Our Global Neighborhood Report. This study was published in 1995
by the Commission on Global Governance, an independent group of 28 leaders
under the chainnanship of Ingvar Carlsson. The then Dutch Minister for Develop-
ment Co-operation and fonner Labor MP, Jan Pronk, also sat on the Commission.
The report pointed out that it was imperative to develop agiobal civic ethic as the
cornerstone of a more effective system of global governance. Such a global civic
ethic was referred to as 'a common commitment to a set of core values that can
unite people ofall cultural, political, religious or philosophical backgrounds' .28
Contrary to what theories about an imminent 'clash of civilizations' would have
us believe, such a basic consensus was reached as early as 1993 in the form of a Dec-
laration of a Clobal Ethic, adopted by the Parliament of W orld Religions in Chi-
cago.29 The Declaration was signed by representatives ofvirtually all major and minor
world religions, but formulated in such a way that it would also be acceptable to the
non-religious. The Declaration is premised on the idea of 'full realization of the in-
trinsic dignity of man, the inalienable freedom and principal equality of all people
and the necessary solidarity and interdependence of all people'. The notion of hu-
man dignity is, of course, what underlies the idea of the rule of law. It is subse-
quently fonnulated in the Declaration as a fundamental requirement that each human
being be treated humanely. Four general traditional guidelines on human conduct
are derived from this requirement. These can be found in most religions of the
world: the obligation towards a culture of non-violence and respect for life ('thou
shalt not kill'), the obligation towards a culture of solidarity and a just economie
order ('thou shalt not steal'), the obligation towards a culture of toleranee and a life
of truthfulness ('thou shalt not lie') and the obligation towards a culture of equal
26 www.whitehouse.gov.
27 See James W. Skillen, 'Foreign policy and intemationaljustice. Are there criteria for judgment?', Public
justice Report 26 (2003) 4-5, 8.
28 Our Global Neighborhood. The report ofthe commission onglobal governance, Oxford 1995, p. 48.
29 The Declaration isfound at www.weltethos.org.
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rights and partnership between man and woman ('thou shalt not commit sexual
immorality') .
Sueh an - existing - ethic cou1d weIl serve as a moral foundation for a new
world order, be it that it follows from the Declaration itself that democracy and the
rule of law cannot be promoted separatelyon the basis of different ethical standards.
Viewed from this perspective, Europc's broader moral approach, which includes
social rights, is more likely to materialize, than the more narrow morality prevalent
in the United States with its emphasis on political and economie freedom. The new
world order will have to be just or it just will not beo Furthermore, the rule of law
can only be credibly promoted by regimes that themselves respect internationallaw.
The European approach also seems potentially more successful, therefore, in relation
to the second difference.
Another question that could be asked is whether the world order envisioned by
the drafi European Constitution, characterized by the principles of the welfare state,
is compatible with the emphasis placed by pluralist thought on civil society. In re-
sponse to this, it shou1d first of all be noted, in general, that the concept of public
justice implies that governments have a responsibility of their own, which cannot be
assigned to others, even where internal social policy is concerned. This applies a
fortiori to international society, where thus far there has been too little rather than
too much government intervention. This having been said, it is striking how rightly
the Our Global Neighborhood Report emphasizes the importance of an emerging
global civil society, much more so than the draft European Constitution does.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter it was argued that, from a pluralist point ofview, the main criteria on
the basis ofwhich the European Constitution project should be judged are domestic
justice, comprising both structural and confessional pluralism, and international
justice. These criteria are not new; on the contrary, they have been gradually devel-
oped in Calvinist political theory during the past five centuries. They even go back,
at least in part, as far as the writings of Saint Augustine (354-430). Yet, considering
their current problematic application in both Europe and the United States, calling
them to nrind at the start ofwhat could ultimately become a new phase in the proc-
ess of European unification, does not seem a superl1uous act. Moreover, the pluralist
approach seems to be of particular relevanee to a Union which, according to the
Preamble of its draft Constitution, views itself as 'united in its diversity'.
With respect to domestic justice, it was concluded that the draft European Con-
stitution can hardly be thought of as satisfactory. It is not so much the Preamble that
is the problem, as one would have expected in view of the discussions during the
Convention, but rather the main body of the draft Constitution, in which not one
unambiguous reference is made to either structural or confessional pluralism. As a
result, the standard of public justice is not met, in spite of the fact that the word
'justice' is used more than once in the draft Constitution.
The situation seems better, at first sight, where internationaljustice is concerned.
On paper, Europe's ideals in this area better reflect pluralist values than those of the
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Bush administration. The first challenge for the Union in the coming years will he
developing a common foreign and security poliey, however.
All in all, from a pluralist perspective, the drafi: Constitution contains several
elements which ought to he preserved in any new phases entered into hy the Euro-
pean Constitution project, hecause they would give the Union more the charaeter
of a community ofvalues. Moreover, the Union can help to promote these values,
notahly democracy and the rule oflaw, throughout the world hy its extemal action.
They can he seen as necessary preconditions for the more specific doctrines of con-
stitutional theory that derive from a pluralist view of society. These more specific
doctrines are regarded hy their adherents as of relevanee to all cultures as weIl as all
times, hecause they are assumed to correspond 'with the way things really are in
terms of God and the nature of human heing'.30 A statement of this nature ref1ects
their worldview, hut then '(i)n asense, every theory is a faith-inspired "testimony"
to what a theorist ohserves '.31
30 Peter S. Heslam, 'Prophet of a third way: the shape of Kuyper's socio-politica! vision',journal ofMar-
kets and Morality 5: 2002, pp. 11-33, at p. 26.
31 John Hiemstra, Worldviews on the Air,founding a pluralist broadcasting system in the Netherlands, Lanham,
MD 1997, p. 151.
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